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Post-Colonial Macau: hope and
despair in a World Centre of
Tourism and Leisure
Michael O’Regan
1 Located at the mouth of the Pearl River Delta, west of Hong Kong, and bordered to the
north by Guangdong province, Macau became a Special Administrative Region [SAR] of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in December 1999 when sovereignty passed from
Portugal to China. Under the “one country, two systems” model established by the 1987
Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, Macau has a Constitution known as the Basic Law
which states that with the exception of foreign and defense affairs, it retains a high
degree of autonomy until 2049 when it should fall under full Chinese control. Prior to
the handover,  manufacturing was the predominant industry in Macau,  with factory
production  of  toys,  shoes,  artificial  flowers,  firecrackers,  matches,  joss-sticks  and
textiles contributing 37.8% to Macau’s Gross National Product (GNP) and 45% of jobs in
1988 (Sit et al., 1991). The end of the World Trade Organization quotas under the Multi-
Fiber  Arrangement  (1974-2005)  led  Hong  Kong  industrialists  who  had  established
textile  and  garment  manufacturing  bases  in  Macau  to  withdraw  to  lower-cost
territories, leading to the sector’s decline.
2 As much of  the  manufacturing  exports  and jobs  were  quota  dependent,  the  sector
declined as Macau’s  quota allowance for textiles  and garments were eliminated.  Its
contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell to less than 1% and only employed
3.4% of the workforce by 2011 (Mieiro et al., 2012). While the unemployment rate was
1.5% in  1989,  it  reached a  record high of  7.1% in  the  second quarter  of  2000.  The
colonial authorities’ efforts to develop external economic links were unsuccessful, with
the  newly  formed  SAR  entering  the  postcolonial  arena  with  distinct  structural
disadvantages in comparison to its sister SAR, Hong Kong, with its deep sea ports and
larger population. With less than 10 per cent of Macau’s employed population attaining
tertiary qualifications in 1999, and at 28.2 square km2, with no arable land, pastures,
forest,  or  woodland,  Macau  was  in  crisis.  However,  by  2003,  Macau  achieved  a
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substantial budget surplus and substantial GDP growth; which accelerated to 27.5% by
2010. While Macau GDP per capita was US$13,000 in 2000, it had risen to US$73,376 by
2016. Tourism arrivals had increased from 7.44 million in 1999 (1.63 million from the
mainland) to 39.4 Million in 2019 (28 million mainland visitors). By 2020, Macau’s GDP
will  reach approximately US$143,000 per person,  according to the IMF.  That  would
make it the location with the highest GDP per person on a purchasing power parity
basis  in  the  world.  With  zero  government  debt,  healthy  fiscal  reserves  and  a  low
unemployment rate (1.9 per cent in 2018), it was a “miraculous” turnaround for a small
Portuguese colony.
3 This “miracle” occurred after Edmund Ho, the first Chief Executive (CE) of the MSAR
secured Beijing’s  backing for  “neoliberal  casino-restructuring  measures”  (Liu,  2008)
during December 2000. While the colonial authorities had legalized gambling in 1847
when  small  and  unregistered  casinos  were  prevalent,  the  industry  had  not  fully
developed  because  of  outbound  travel  restrictions  from  mainland  China.  Gambling
accounted for  less  than 26% of  Macau’s  GDP in 1999 (Ho,  2005),  with gross gaming
revenue  worth  US$1.6  billion.  Macau  authorities  expanded  the  number  of  gaming
licenses in 2002 by granting three concessions and three sub-concessionaires through a
Gambling  Tender  Commission  (Simpson,  2018).  This  enabled  Sociedade  de  Jogos  de
Macau (SJM), a subsidiary of STDM, Galaxy Casino, S.A. (Galaxy), Wynn Resorts, Sands
China Ltd, MGM Grand Paradise, S.A., and Melco Crown Jogos to enter the Macau casino
market  which  had  been  monopolized  by  STDM  since  1962.  The  Closer  Economic
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) signed in on 17 October 2003 led Beijing to introduce
the “Individual Visit scheme” (IVS), which currently allows residents of 49 mainland
cities to apply for a tourist visa to visit Macau in an individual capacity. 
4 To explore the lived experiences and quality of life in a “World Centre of Tourism and
Leisure”,  in-depth,  semi-structured  interviews  with  local  residents  (N  =  22)  were
carried out between October 2014 and May 2015. The residents were born, raised and
lived in Macao and held Macao residency. The lead author hired and trained two final
year tourism and hotel management students to conduct interviews with the residents
in Cantonese. These were then translated into English, checked and confirmed via a
reverse-translation of three interviews. Interviewers were instructed not to create any
interpretations during the interviews. To gather more in-depth data, interviewees were
encouraged to speak about their life in Macau. All  interviews were digitally (audio)
recorded with the interviewees’ permission. The transcripts identified a theme around
a “magical” economy after informants asked about their rights,  about the powerful
business and political  elites and about the perceived abnormal material,  social,  and
spatial conditions present in Macau. Following Comaroff and Comaroff’s (1999; 2003)
challenge  to  researchers  to  investigate  on  an  “awkward  scale,”  which  is  neither
unambiguously “local” nor obviously “global” - but on a scale in between, the theme
was developed by the authors into an anthropological inquiry about the interwoven
relationship between Macau’s history, colonization, and its self-proclaimed image as a
world  centre  of  tourism  and  leisure.  Rather  than  a  thematic  analysis  of  those
interviewed, the paper utilizes Comaroff and Comaroff’s post-colonial paradigm of the
“occult economy,” which is both described and defined as the “allure of accruing wealth
from nothing” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000, p. 313). Its characteristics often transgress
the conventional, the rational, and the moral, with Comaroff and Comaroff defining
such  “economies,”  as  the  “the  conjuring  of  wealth  by  resort  to  inherently  mysterious
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techniques, whose principles of operation are neither transparent nor explicable in conventional
terms” (p. 297). 
5 This paper will describe the breakdown in the rational relationship between means and
end as Macau transformed from a colonial territory to a globalizing world centre of
tourism and leisure. The paper moves beyond discourses that understand tourism and
tourism development in Asia as mediated “authenticity” acting as a catalyst for further
economic development or a means to affirm legitimacy (Burns, 2008). We argue that
the  occult  economy  paradigm  offers  an  interpretative  framework  by  putting  the
spotlight on the rich and the powerful rather than those in poverty and the powerless
(Nader, 1972), so as to grasp how tourism, as a highly ambiguous term, has been framed
by  those  in  positions  of  power  as  solely  underpinning  its  success.  This  approach
requires studying “the colonizers rather than the colonized, the culture of power rather than
the culture of the powerless” (Nader, 1972, p. 289) by asking “common sense” questions in
reverse about why government, businesses, decision makers, and creators of creators of
socio-economic politics failed to gamble on more conventional markets when seeking
to meet the needs of its citizens, and why the introduction of the category of “World
Centre  of  Tourism  and  Leisure” as  a  barometer  of  “economic  growth”  and  social
stability  obscures  nefarious  transactions,  rumors,  speculation,  arcane  rituals  and
irrational desires, and thwarted chances for improving quality of life. As a strategy to
add richness and color to this research and to enable the reader to draw their own
conclusions  from  participants’  words,  verbatim  quotations  from  informants  are
utilized.
 
I. Colonial Legacies
6 Like many colonial cities and territories with trade-oriented histories which take on
the  consuming logic  of  market  forces,  illicit  accumulation can overwhelm the  civil
surfaces of post-colonial countries and fuel a “vibrant, immoral economy pulsing beneath
the  sluggish  rhythm”  (Comaroff  and Comaroff,  1999,  p.  285).  Comaroff  and Comaroff
(2000, p. 310), describe these economies based on “modes of speculation based on less than
rational connections between means and ends.” Such economies, they argue, can draw in
whole populations allured by accruing “wealth without production, value without effort”
(pp. 313-314). The concept came to be used to describe Nigeria’s oil fueled rise and fall
in the seventies (Apter, 2005), Haiti (James, 2012), Ireland (Coen and Maguire, 2012) and
Mexico’s in the 1980s (Cahn, 2008). 
7 From  allowing  entrepreneurial  Chinese  immigrants  to  survive  at  the  margins  of  a
discriminatory racial–capitalist order (Louw, 2019) to corpses in the freezer of a casino
in  South  Africa  being  linking  to  wealth  creation  (Comaroff  and  Comaroff,  20002b),
casinos have long been linked to illicit accumulation. To explain why Macau should
seek recourse in expanding casinos concessions and illicit accumulation as a “magic
bullet” reflects a specific set of historical colonial experiences. Under the Portuguese
administration and partly because of the legacy of Portuguese colonial rule itself, there
was an ambiguous mix of “possibility and powerlessness, of desire and despair” (Gluckman,
1963,  pp.  3-4)  during the  colonial  handover  period,  when it  was  plagued by arson,
murders, fire bombings and shootouts between rival gangs. While Macau wasn’t subject
to  outright  poverty  or  material  deprivation,  many worried  about  the  deteriorating
social  order (Hing,  2005).  The authorities in many ways had effectively lost  control
Post-Colonial Macau: hope and despair in a World Centre of Tourism and Leisure
Via, 16 | 2019
3
(Chou,  2013),  with  limited  autonomy  vis-a-vis  the  Beijing-backed  traditional
associations born out of the Cultural Revolution and the powerful STDM group. Macau
also suffered an economic recession in the wake of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crises,
with real GDP declining for four consecutive years up to 1999, which in turn led to
increased joblessness and a housing market crash. Because of the regional financial
crisis  and limited re-investment  by  the  STDM group,  there  was  a  9.1% decrease  in
government revenue produced by the direct tax on gambling in 1999. It meant those
who experienced the  transition in  1999,  did  so  during  a  period of  instability,  with
young people who often have the greatest expectations, denied the expected wealth
distribution  (Liu,  2009).  Rather  than  confronting  uncertainty  and  investing  on
conventional markets to potentially prosper from new purpose, creativity and vitality,
the new government rejected the slow growth that often comes as part of parcel of a
post-colonial economy (Grier,  1999).  Instead, it  outwardly embraced free enterprise,
flexible accumulation, and financial speculation to accumulate wealth. Rather than a
capture by “Capitalist Sorcery” (Pignarre and Stengers, 2011), the decision to expand
casino concessions and depend on mainland gamblers to generate resources reflected
the residues of colonial rule (Godinho, 2014).
8 Historically,  the authorities in Macau refilled their depleted coffers by appealing to
techniques  that  defy  explanation  in  conventional  terms.  Unconventional  ways  to
become  wealthier  often  arose  during  transitional  and  opportunistic  periods.  A
Tokugawa shogun policy in 1640 ended Japanese trade and the loss of Malacca to the
Dutch  in  1641  ended  the  Macau-Goa  (India)  trade.  The  end  of  the  Iberian  dual
monarchy  in  1668  stopped  the  Macau-Manila  trade  and  Hong  Kong’s  rise  as  an
important trading port after the Qing government ceded it in 1842 to the British led
Macau  to  be  sidelined.  During  these  turbulent  times,  the  authorities  facilitated
gambling,  prostitution,  mercenaries,  arms  trafficking,  human  trafficking  as  well  as
opium  and  “indentured  servant”  coolie  trade  (Pinheiro,  2002).  When  Hong  Kong
prohibited gambling in 1870, as Canton did in 1911 (Ho, 2005), Macau facilitated it, and
attracted  new  businesses  and  gamblers.  Foreign  opium,  first  introduced  by  the
Portuguese from Goa at  the beginning of the 18th century was prohibited in China
during  1796,  leading  Macau  to  become  a  transshipment  place  home  for  opium
smugglers,  with  traders  and locals  participating  and profiting  (Garrett,  2010;  Puga,
2013). After British involvement in the coolie trade from China ended in 1854, trade
shifted to Macau (Meagher, 2008). It was only eliminated in 1873 after pressure from
the  British  and  the  Qing  government  (Pinheiro,  2002).  Even  after  the  communist
revolution in China in 1949, Macau maintained its status as a hub for illicit trade, as it
allegedly served as a conduit for smuggling gold, petrol, metals and automobiles into
China  as  well  as  weapons  during  the  Korean  War  in  an  effort  to  circumvent  UN
mandates (Dicks, 1984). 
9 While often not directly involved, the colonial authorities after 1846 nurtured these
activities by opening up to rapid, immaterial flows of goods and people and immaterial
flows of services and information and taxing them so as to produce “immense wealth and
power without regular work-against all odds, at supernatural speed, and with striking ingenuity
” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999, p. 284). These lightly regulated activities served the
interests of local authorities, foreign merchants, triads and local elites, but excluded
the  vast  majority  of  ethnic  Chinese  citizens  from  economic,  social  and  political
integration (Cheng, 1999;  Clayton, 2010).  The choice to pursue market liberalization
through casinos concessions was sanctioned by domestic elites and a Beijing-backed
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establishment. Because Macau found itself in an “ambivalent” economic situation with
the fading out of the old colonial administration and, the new SAR government remade
itself as a free port, a separate tariff zone without foreign exchange controls, and a
“mecca”  for  mainland  gamblers.  While  the  decision  dealt  with  the  deformities
consistent with a postcolonial economy, such as the difficulties of establishing normal
market principles, and seeking transnational investment in the slipstream of a local
property crash and a regional financial crisis (Zheng and Wan, 2014), Macau became a
space of “neo-liberal” exception (Ong, 2006) within the now expanded “one country,
two  systems”  PRC.  The  magical  allure  of  “making  money  from  nothing”  attracted
transient  gamblers,  migrant  workers,  property  tycoons,  businessmen,  sex  workers,
corrupt officials,  investors,  criminals and junket operators1.  Creating and displaying
sudden affluence, meant many, like, the casino operator “Broken Tooth” (Hing, 2005;
Simpson, 2019), and Macau Junket Boss Alvin Chau of Suncity became objects of fame
and  admiration.  Circulating  unevenly,  and  often  with  no  clear  relationship  to
production, work, law or effort these material and immaterial flows were constituted
for  and  by  local  elites,  non-state  actors  and  a  developing  transient  multinational
population. They were the foundation for prosperity which has fueled new highways, a
light  rail  system,  university  buildings,  benefit  schemes  and  massive  casino  resort
complexes. By promising to put wealth into the hands of resident’s through casinos for
mainland and Hong Kong visitors, the government advocated the benefits of massive,
unearned wealth from casino gambling, an activity banned in the mainland since 1949.
10 From  a  culture  supposedly  devoted  to  work-and-place  rooted  in  local  community,
strong familial-ethnic bonds and “conservative values of hard work and dependability” (Sit
et al 1991,p. 85), an epochal shift took place in “the constitutive relationship of production
to consumption, and hence of labor to capital” (Comaroff and Comarof, 2000, p. 293). The
government’s  inability to control  rapid inflows and outflows through a deregulated
economy  remade,  reclaimed,  reproduced,  engineered,  and  commoditized  Macau’s
landscape,  social  fabric,  leisure,  employment  conditions,  universities,  corporate
structure and everyday life (Blackburn Cohen, 2019; Hall et al., 2017; Hao, 2005), turning
its  young people  and migrants  into  an army of  casino  workers,  which undermines
traditional values, and quality of life.
 
II. Governance and Civil Society in a Tourism
Destination
11 While governments around the world have often tried to benefit from the proceeds of
gambling (Leiper, 1989), Macau has incorporated it into its material and fiscal heart.
Direct and indirect reliance on casino-related activities through gambling levies and
taxes are nearly the only means of filling its coffers, with 2018 seeing US$38 billion of
gross  casino  revenue.  While  only  six  25-year  licenses  were  issued,  a  2012  Fitch
sovereign assessment estimated Macau derived 87.7% of its GDP from gambling (and
related activities, such as hotels); and relies on this sector for 85% of its fiscal revenue.
The tourism satellite account survey in 2010 found that gambling is largely dependent
on mainland visitors  who account  for  about  70% of  all  visitors.  Some 97.3% of  the
gaming industry’s takings came from visitors and 84% of what tourists spent in Macau
is spent on gambling (Bland, 2015). The gaming industry accounted for 75.8% of the jobs
in the city in 2015 according to Macau’s Statistics and Census Service (DSEC). 
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12 Civil  society  is  weak,  with  no  serious  attempts  to  reflect  on  the  casino-dependent
economy  (Liu,  2008).  The  1,720  civil  associations  that  existed  in  1999,  while
representing  diversity  of  interests,  and  including  pro-Beijing  interest  groups,  were
brought into the workings of government after the handover. Edmund Ho, a key player
in  local  business  circles  and  the  leader  in  the  local  pro-China  groups  before  the
handover, became the first CE (Choi, 2008). The number of associations increased to
over 5,000 by 2011 (Zheng and Wan,  2014),  with most groups,  including the Macau
Federation of Trade Unions, the General Union of Neighborhood Associations of Macau,
the Macau Women’s General Association, the General Association of Chinese Students
of Macau and the Macau General Volunteers Association taking funding through the
government-controlled Macao Foundation, whose money comes from a levy of 1.6% on
the gross gaming revenues. The foundation serves as a locus of distribution with the
US$284.5  million  distributed  in  2018  ensuring  the  co-opting  of  civil  society  (Chou,
2012).  Media  coverage  related  to  gambling  itself,  and  its  downsides  are  rarely
mentioned, with self-censorship prevalent due to fear of losing advertising from the
SAR departments and the casino industry (Su, 2017).
13 The  opacity  of  bureaucratic  practices  in  Macau  (James,  2012;  Press,  2007)  is  an
impediment to  fostering civil  society and thereby good governance.  From secretive
land deals for casino resorts, government procurement issues, use of tax incentives, the
allocation and grants to key individuals and associations,  the ability of residents to
question their  government  or  political  system is  significantly  restricted due  to  the
election/appointment  system, and  a  political  system  based  on  ties  between
businessmen, Legislative Assembly (LA) members and government officials. Consensus
is  usually  coordinated  between  the  government,  local  elites  and  Beijing.  The
Government  is  headed  by  secretariats,  the  former  being  appointed  by  the  Central
People’s Government in Beijing through a 300-member Election Committee made up of
casino bosses like MGM’s Pansy Ho and Galaxy’s Francis Lui, as well as business leaders,
trade unions and other groups appointed by the Central Government. The Legislative
Assembly  (LA)  is  a  33-member  body  comprising  14  directly  elected  members,  12
indirectly  elected  members  representing  functional  constituencies  and  7  members
appointed by the Chief Executive (CE). Macau’s Basic Law does not provide for universal
suffrage or direct election of either the legislature or the CE. 
 
III. Anxiety, Suspicion and Insecurity in a Tourism
Destination
14 Casinos,  while  providing  opportunities,  have  heightened  uncertainties,  suspicion,
disaffection and anxiety about identity in Macau, with informants feeling left out of the
promises for a better life and worried about the future. John, 40, worries about the
mainland authorities, and whether they will continue to support gambling, “What I can
only predict  is  that Macau will  maintain its  advantages in next five years,  but after that,  I
actually have no ideas. We have to await decisions from the central government”. Jennifer, 32,
similarly argued that if the “Mainland China put more effort on fighting corruption here, it
will reduce mainland tourist . . . and the foreign companies will leave Macau”. Jane, 32, like
others, hopes that “there will be some other industries to help balance this situation”. 
15 The dependence on gambling has undermined the values of productivity and rational
accumulation and increased anxiety about the production and reproduction of wealth
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in a society that combines the “odd fusion of the modern and the postmodern, of hope and
hopelessness, of utility and futility, of promise and its perversions” (Comaroff and Comaroff,
1999, p. 283). There is a “pervasive sense of false value, of surplus accumulated without proper
production” (Comaroff and Comaroff,  1999,  p.  281),  with condemnation, jealousy and
envy of  “those  who  enrich  themselves  in  nontraditional  ways” (Comaroff  and Comaroff,
2000, p. 316) even while pursuing new, magical means for otherwise unattainable ends
themselves. 
16 Occult economies, then, “offer up vast, almost instantaneous riches to those who master its
spectral technologies — and, simultaneously, to threaten the very existence of those who do not”
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999, p. 298). These feelings flourish in a territory, dependent
on gambling, where “the possibility of rapid achievement, of amassing a fortune by largely
invisible  methods,  is  always  palpably  present”  (Comaroff  and  Comaroff,  1999,  p.  293).
Despite numerous surveys led by government bodies, statistics and reports, there is a
paucity  of  information  about  Macau’s  most  influential  actors  and  decisions.  From
rumored AI and digital technology which tracks gamblers most drawn to risk, the pawn
shops which help Chinese mainlanders smuggle assets across the border (Varese et al.,
2019), the true shareholders behind some casino groups, to the junket operators backed
by Asian organized crime syndicates (Lo and Kwok, 2017), there is a mysterious, and
unseen invisible world behind the World Centre of Tourism and Leisure (McKenzie et
al., 2019) that creates and reinforces real wealth for the few (West and Sanders, 2003).
Residents  who  feel  disempowered  and  disadvantaged  fight  back  through  gossip,
superstition, paranoia, conspiracies, rumors and jealousy, so as to make sense of and
act upon the world (Zhu, 2019).
17 Stories and rumors are primarily related to uncertainty, scarcity, and risk in a society
where  invisible  powers  sometimes  produce  visible  outcomes.  Stories  abound  about
businessmen  “disappearing”  from  China  through  Macau  with  millions  of  dollars,
neighbors running illegal inns for gamblers, underground banks, foreign spies and the
unlawful detention of gamblers (for repayment of loans). Stories about the “Gods of
Gambling” like Sheldon Adelson (Sands) and Lui Che Woo (Galaxy Entertainment), who
own casinos, are daily conversations. Many are seen to possess extraordinary powers
by way of nefarious links to officials and organized crime (Lo, 2005). As none of the
main casino players live in Macau, and casino stock is traded in Hong Kong and the US,
casino tycoons have insinuated themselves into the slipstream of the global economy,
thereby often evading knowledge of its costs,  as well as escaping most sanctions or
control. Whilst often standing accused of various nefarious acts, it is often their staff
under threat, while, they have escaped any serious criminal prosecution (Lintner, 2016;
McKenzie  et  al.,  2019).  Likewise,  those  who  help  mainland  gamblers  sidestep  strict
currency-export controls, or those who run brothels in casinos (Fraser, 2019) remain a
part of everyday life (Pomfret, 2014; Wang and Eadington, 2008; Wang and Zabielskis,
2010). 
18 In everyday gossip, issues related to unequal distribution of resources such as wealth,
employment and infrastructure, and of social resources like health services, education,
transport  and housing are strongly present.  For  every story about the residents  or
gamblers who became millionaires (or lost it all) either through gambling or casino
reward programs, there are other stories about inequalities, injustices, corruption and
violence brought about through gambling. Integrated casino resorts that foster social
and  spatial  inequalities  are  constructed  rapidly;  even  “magically  overnight”  while
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public infrastructure has failed to keep pace or break ground. Macau’s mass-transit
(LRT)  system,  various  public-housing  projects  and  the  opening  of  a  second  public
hospital, among other initiatives, have been repeatedly delayed or multiplied in cost.
Rather than act as a provider of infrastructure services, the government has prioritized
spaces for gamblers. The 20-kilometer light-rail transit system, first proposed by the
SAR government in 2003 was partially completed in 2019, but will primarily serve the
Cotai Strip casinos and bypass low-income residential areas. Jennifer, 32 notes that the
“LRT is convenient for the tourist, but not designed for resident use”.
19 With a population of 632,418 people in 2018 (from 430,000 in 1999), and a labor force
that  is  less  than  400,000  strong,  the  labor  market  and  conventional  terms  of
employment  have  been  destroyed,  with  “skilled  laborers”  such  as  ship  builders
replaced by less skilled, immature workers to ensure more maladaptive workers for the
tourism  sector.  There  is  no  universal  freedom  of  association,  collective  bargaining
rights, no protection against the blacklisting and sacking of strikers and no standard
minimum wage. As 40% of secondary students repeating at least one school year (OCED,
2011),  local  teenagers  drop  their  studies  by  the  lure  of  the  generous  starting-pay
packages  in  the  casinos.  This  means  there  are  considerable  shortages  of  qualified
teachers, nurses, engineers and doctors. While workers may feel in control, given the
low unemployment rate and quota system for locals, most, given the lack of a diverse
economy,  merely  move from one casino  group to  another.  John,  40,  argues  that  it
doesn’t  matter which casino you work for as “the gaming companies  share the similar
principles and values of management,” and has as a consequence lost some of his health
and youth. He notes that “Smoking and working at night are really harmful to me, and I
might  have lost  ten-years  of  longevity  because of  this  job”.  Such workers are defined as
“ghost labor” by Comaroff and Comaroff (2002a), given casinos businesses siphon of
their workers essence, and even appropriate their children’s future work choices. Many
informants work shifts in the 24-hour casinos. Jane, 22, noted “We work the 6am morning
shift. It means that we need to get up around 3am or 4am in the morning and get ready for work
”. Even though she is a dealer, a relatively high paid casino position, most training is
related to table games like Baccarat. John, 40, notes that “I have to accept nearly whatever
behavior guests perform even though the words and behaviors are too rude and insane.” This
suggests that the casino dealer positions, albeit well paid and reserved for locals, are
very stressful (Chau, 2019).
20 The approximately 188,4800 immigrant “non-resident workers” (2018) in Macau,  on
which the casino sector is heavily dependent, are in a far more precarious position and
denied basic forms of protection, such as transferring to other job categories, holidays,
or compensation for work accidents. If they lose their jobs, they must leave the city
within two days if employed less than a year. As the LA voted to reject a trade union bill
for the seventh time in 2019, the rich and powerful have freedom to further their own
interests, and possibly leading to an increase in inequality (Carvalho, 2018) The allure
of accruing wealth from nothing, inequality, and the lack of conventional speculative
markets  like the stock market,  has led citizens to get  caught up in the speculative
currents. The absences of a comprehensive, internally consistent ideology have enabled
local elites to nurture a competitive ethos on a population seeking palatable payback.
The  lack  of  a  standard  government-approved unified  curriculum,  few quality  third
level institutions,  and Macau’s position as a SAR means many citizen worries about
“losing out” or  being “squeezed out” of  home ownership,  financial  stability,  career
advancement  and even marriage.  This  has  led some citizens  to  speculate  in  zodiac
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banknotes2, car parking ownership, or strive for an occupation that can economically
exploit the transient population of non-residents, gamblers and workers (employment
agencies,  pharmacies  offering  safe  product  to  mainlanders,  pawn  shops  which
circumvent currency controls,  and realtors who offer short term accommodation to
non-resident workers). As citizens’ confidence about once-legible processes, like home
ownership and the distribution of  wealth fractures,  people feel  that  playing by the
rules will destroy them. For Billy, 22 “the price of every commodity sold here is ridiculously
high, but most local residents, including me has gradually grown numb about it because you
have to accept the reality whether you like it or not”. For most informants who participated
in this study, housing and medical costs were a major issue. Jane, 32, argued that “the
prices of the houses and the commodity price have risen a lot, like crazy, really crazy! So even if
you are paid US$2,500 to US$3,750, you still cannot afford it”. John, 40, noted the “ridiculously
high housing prices”. Mary, 23, argues that “although the government offers many monetary
benefits to citizens, the soft benefits and compensation are not enough. The quality of medical
treatment in Macau is so terrible that people must go to Hong Kong and China for treatment
when they get ill. And even though you just have a cold, you have spent too much time waiting
for treatment in the public hospitals”. Chris, 59, claims that “it is very difficult to consult a
doctor as it takes a very long time, even to booking a date [to see a doctor]”.
 
IV. Divine Aid and Cycles of Instability
21 After breakneck development exhausted social resources that “previously served to shape
popular consent” (Liu, 2008, p. 23), problems and contradictions have emerged in Macau.
After a series of social demonstrations in 2006, 2007 and 2014 by construction workers,
local  civil  servants  and  others  took  place,  the  credibility  and  integrity  of  the
government became undermined (Lao and Siu,  2013;  Liu,  2008).  Over  20,000 people
rallied in May, 2014 against a bill  that would exempt the CE from criminal liability
during  their  term.  However,  despite  political/economic  adjustments,  any  resident
dissent or any sign of resistance in Macau is met by censorship and “divine” blessings
to the resident population, by way of new subsidies, grants, scholarships and casinos to
spend leisure time. Two 2007 demonstrations led the Government to announce that
holders of a Macau Resident Identity Card would receive nearly US$1,000 each year as
part of a “wealth distribution scheme.” This has increased to US$1,250. Protected by job
quota systems, social housing and annual payments, subsidies are given for electricity
and water, while annual subventions are paid to underpaid workers, teachers, students,
retired  civil  servants  and  senior  citizens.  Casinos  usually  provide  employees  two
additional  months  of  salary  each  year  to  superimpose  “trust  and  confidence”  in
employees and their families for a future that may not exist. Sheila, 60, for example,
felt “I never thought of immigrating to other countries because the government granted annual
subsidies for the residents”. For Tracy, 24, however, “the government just sends us money, but
it cannot fully solve the problems [transport, medical costs, and housing].
22 While being small amounts, such “divine aid” makes tangible the idea that the new
prosperity  is  being  shared.  Autonomy  in  cultural  expression,  job  quotas,  grants,
subsidies  and  government  redistribution  techniques,  cannot  compensate  for
institutional constraints and public discontent. It robs “the public” of its “vitality and,
reciprocally, vulgarizes the political — with it, nationhood as well — reducing it to a chimera,
which creates the need for yet more magic” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000, p. 328). The
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executive branch (and casinos) seeks to “hide” net negative societal impacts behind
cultural  and social  assets  generated  by  casinos  (events,  art  galleries,  free  concerts,
parenting  seminars  for  employees  and  discounts  for  residents),  and  stave  off
discontent, minimize demonstrations, workplace disruption or anyone disrupting acts
of excessive consumption (Buhi,  2019;  Strauss,  2015).  It  is  extremely difficult  to get
permission for any type of public demonstration. From spending public money through
the Macao Foundation on a month long Macau shopping festival to banning Hong Kong
lawmakers,  activists  and  academics  from  entering  Macau,  the  political  system  has
become  undermined  with  decisions  increasingly  centered  on  safeguarding  the
operations of the gambling market and transnational corporations. The government
has resorted to “mass-mediated ritual both to produce state power and national unity and to
persuade citizens of their reality” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000, p. 327). This has led to
lavish fireworks displays (costing US$3 million in 2018), multiple festivals (food, film,
light),  which merely draw attention to its  fragility and “the ineluctable  differences  on
which the body politic is built, to the divergence of interests that it must embrace” (Comaroff
and Comaroff, 2000, p. 328). 
 
V. Tourism and the Hyperreal
23 For authorities and Beijing, the occult economy is hidden by the veneer of tourist led
prosperity, iconic architecture, and tourism promotions. Tourism is routinely uttered,
as if calling upon this concept hides the hyperreal constellation of casino attractions
and  hyper-consumption  that  changes  vast  personal  financial  gambling  losses  as
“tourist”  consumption  (Hom,  2015).  Casinos  disguise  a  problematic  human  activity
which relies on the promise of instant enrichment through alternative means, such as
magic, skills, intuition and ancestral inheritance (Hamilakis, 2016). While criticized as
degenerate for its nonproductive nature in many parts of the world (Reith, 2007), the
courting of irrational forces of chance and the focus on delivering in the “here and
now”  leaves  Macau  liable  to  pressures  and  incentives  from  Beijing,  speculators,
political blocs and non-state transnational actors. Comaroff and Comaroff (2000, p. 295)
describe gambling as a “pariah” practice situated at liminal places of “leisure and/or the
haunts of those (aristocrats, profligates, “chancers”) above and beyond honest toil” and the “
epitome  of  immoral  accumulation”  (Comaroff  and  Comaroff,  2000,  p.  295).  While
dependent on gambling and the wealth it produces, official discourse rarely mentions
gambling,  least  it  provides  an  ugly  reminder  to  the  mainland  government  of  the
obscure  transactions  Macau’s  economy is  built  on.  At  least  to  outsiders,  the  occult
economy is consigned to the periphery by concealing it within the conflated “World
Centre  of  Tourism  and  Leisure”  category.  After  a  2008  report  by  the  National
Development and Reform Commission, Beijing sought to position Macau as a World
Centre of Tourism and Leisure (the phrase at that time was “Macau as a Global Centre of
Tourism and Recreation”). The 12th National Five-Year Plan of 2011 announced support
for this positioning/aspiration, and in 2015, the Macau SAR Government submitted a
specific  proposal  for  the  13th  National  Five-Year  Plan.  In  October  2015,  the  CE
established the Commission for the Construction of the World Centre of Tourism and
Leisure. This illusion of Macau as a new World Centre of Tourism and Leisure seeks to
obscure  gambling,  and  other  speculative  activities,  with  the  2017  master  plan  not
mentioning casinos or gambling as an activity in the territory (MGTO, 2017). 
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24 Tourism has become something of a pyramid scheme as “the more it is indulged, the more
it  is  required”  (Comaroff  and  Comaroff,  2000,  p.  328).  Despite  having  identified  a
carrying capacity between 32.62 million and 33.7 million in 2014 (IFT, 2015), the Macau
Government Tourism Office (MGTO, 2017) is planning for 40 million visitors in 2025 – a
number that it almost reached in 2019 (see below). The illusion of the “World Centre of
Tourism and Leisure” concept means carrying capacity is also a political construct, and
a fictitious number, with the forecasts of other actors, both visible and invisible, having
the  power  to  produce  and  define  the  nature  of  tourism,  and  keep  the  hegemonic
project  alive.  Today,  residents  try  to  live  their  lives  in  an economy that  works  on
probability and confidence and conceals the rapid accumulation of wealth by the few
(Coen and Maguire, 2012), but at the expense of thwarted aspiration and control and
estrangement by unseen forces. Rather than tourism numbers, Macau remains fixated
on  forecasts  and  numbers  that’s  have  acquired  a  mystical  significance:  monthly
gambling  revenue  figures.  The  World  Centre  of  Tourism and  Leisure  category  also
obscures other illicit  numbers,  such as the number of  unlicensed workers from the
unemployed populations of Guangdong and Fujian provinces, to the numbers of women
working in brothels.  Unable to exercising stable control  over space,  time,  or  flows,
there were 39.4 million tourist arrivals in 2019. The uncontrolled flows of capital, risk
and people seeking instant returns have damaged Macau’s civil sphere, body politic,
economic health and social integrity. For Tracy, 24 “Macau is not a place for living. This
city only has casino, hotels and tourists”.
25 The “blind democracy of chance in gambling divorced reward from effort or merit” (Reith,
2007, p. 34) has undermined meritocracy in schools, universities, workplace and the
body politic and created new risks, such as a “shadow state” (Reno, 2000) behind the
facade  of  state  sovereignty  and  the  chance  of  Beijing  intervention.  Although
statistically, having one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, people see life
as a lottery as they seek job promotions, (subsidized) housing, kinder garden places,
school-university places, transport and access to government subsidies. Jane, 32, for
example, felt promotion in the casino was difficult as “there already many colleagues who
had tried many times to fight for a promotion, they’ve attended the paper test and interview
many times. But they failed as much as they tried . . . because their social networks are not wide
enough.”
26 Gone is any official speak of egalitarian futures or Macau’s future post-2049. There are
no answers as to whether borders will be fully opened to the mainland, whether the
currency  (MOP)  will  be  dissolved  or  whether  the  SAR  will  be  amalgamated  into  a
broader Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area. There are only scant plans or
preliminary  discussions  by  Macau  authorities  to  tackle  women’s  equality,  labor
organizing, a standard minimum wage for all, LGBT rights, monopolies, social justice,
health care, social security, migrant and immigrant rights, and freedom of the press.
Venus, 24, notes that “discrimination against same-sex couples really exists in Macau. Because
I used to study in a girls’ school, I know some same-sex couples are under high social pressures
because of Chinese traditional ethics. They feel really embarrassed and self-abased when facing
their  families  and  friends.”  As  Macau  eroded  its  control  over  money  supply  and  its
capacity to regulate and control financial flows, property markets, communications,
currencies,  persons,  information,  wealth  and  labor,  it  became  a  zone  of  occult
instability, leading to a fusion of disenfranchisement and limitation. 
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27 As the population is subsumed “into the cultural and ideological functions of the market”
(Liu, 2008, p. 118), the lack of transparency, accountability and stability means some
Macau residents search for “quick-profit” with no long term purpose, passion or plan,
which have resulted in dramatic price rises in healthcare services, and housing. Locals
see any increased wealth amongst non-resident workers as illegitimate (Zhu, 2019). The
“fear of invasion by aliens clothed in humdrum bodily form” (281) means local workers are
always  looking  for  non-resident  mainland  workers  pretending  to  be  local  in  jobs
reserved for them; and have increasingly sought raids to force “underground evil into
public visibility, of reversing the arcane alienation that creates phantom [zombie] workers”
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 2002, p. 789). As Comaroff and Comaroff (2000, p. 326) note,
occult economies lead residents to demand: 
“to stop the inflow of immigrants and others who divert the commonweal away
from autochthons; to incarcerate criminals . . . and other nefarious characters who
spoil the world for upright, hardworking people.”
28 Informants often blamed migrant workers from “alien-nations” like Philippines who
leave  their  homes,  families  and  communities  for  crime,  taking  jobs,  faking  their
background and stalling their career advancement. These ethic divisions are largely
based on classificatory systems governing ethnic diversity that were instituted under
Portuguese rule (Clayton, 2019) and have both helped shape “positive discrimination”
in  favor  of  Macau  residents  and  concerns  about  foreigners  in  social  media  and
informally (Zhu, 2019). A 2018 law, for example, charges non-residents giving birth in
Macau hospitals childbirth fees three times higher than what residents pay (Clayton,
2019).  For  many  informants,  foreign  workers  threaten  to  “siphon  off  the  remaining,
rapidly diminishing prosperity of the indigenous population” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2002a,
p. 789). For Sean, 23, “there are more foreign labors living in my area which might raise up the
crime rate”, while Sally, 21, noted that “people from Nepal, Philippines and more of other
Southeast Asian countries might lead to a rise in the crime rate.” Chris, 59, felt crime was
high with “too many foreign prostitutes” and “and corrupt police, who wouldn’t arrest them.”
Venus, 24 notes that “I have to say that I feel I can’t accept the behaviors and values of some
Mainland Chinese, although I am also from Chinese ancestry.”
29 Macau’s  future  is  based  on confidence,  predictions  and probability  in  an  economy,
which  can  be  destroyed  by  a  signature  in  Beijing  or  merely  talking  about  it in  a
negative way (e.g. leading stock values to drop). Casinos reach into everyone’s homes in
Macau, and are corporeally present, but simultaneously opaque and mysterious. Macau
currently has no strong cultural and political identity or institutions able to resist a
move  away  from deliberate  courting  and promotion  of  irrational  forces  of  chance.
Casinos are the primary attraction, tempting and seducing as “they beckon from that far-
away  which  we  call  the  future”  (Bauman,  2013,  p.  78).  If  any  part  of  the  transient
population of investors, workers, gamblers and elites lose confidence and trust in this
magical  world,  in  which  they  have  speculated  their  wealth,  identities  and  futures,
Macau’s  economic  prosperity  and  social  stability  may  decay.  With  30%  the  labor
population  non-residents,  25%  of  the  population,  including  professionals,  judges,
politicians, and senior civil servants with Portuguese passports (Chou, 2011), and up to
40% of Macau high-school graduates going abroad for college (O’ Keefe, 2013), citizens
are not  confident,  even though authorities  reinforce the idea that  Macau’s  faith in
tourism will somehow overcome a multitude of shortcomings. 
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30 External  stories  about  billions  rumored  to  be  channeled  through  Macau  each  year
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report, 2013) and prostitution
(United  States  Department  of  State,  2018)  cause  anguish,  and  tension.  It  reminds
citizens how little the economy has diversified and how vulnerable it  is  to rumors,
external  actors  and  shocks.  The  same  global  flows  that  created  GDP  growth  are
susceptible to changes in visa and/or cash transfer policies by the mainland; credit
availability and adverse global macroeconomic conditions. An outbreak of avian flu or
an pandemic, such as such as the latest novel coronavirus, 2019-nCoV from Wuhan, a
rise in Federal Reserve interest rates, cyber-attacks, natural catastrophes, a drawback
of  central  bank  stimulus  and  global  liquidity,  and  changes  to  IVS  may  end  the
speculative  boom  and  lead  to  consolidation.  Increasing  disquiet  over  underground
banks, money laundering and the embezzlement of public funds and political failure to
introduce diversification means Beijing can turn off the tap as easily as it turned it on
(Chou, 2011). 
31 Given the uncertainty around a possible limit on tourism by Beijing, and restrictions on
casino concession extensions; casino groups, who are neither accountable or in direct
way responsible towards Macau, have begun to shift their attention to surrounding
jurisdictions. As “old margins become new frontiers, places where mobile, globally-competitive
capital  finds  minimally  regulated  zones”  (Comaroff  and  Comaroff,  2012,  p.  121),  the
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia and Vietnam have become new gambling
destinations. 
 
Concluding Remarks
32 Macau,  always  in  the  vortex  of  regional  economic,  political  and  social  changes
welcomed the handover from Portugal to China in 1999. While never a democracy, the
“one-country, two-system” policy conferred a high degree of autonomy to the city for
policymakers  to  introduce  forestalled  rational  economic  adjustments,  to  remain  a
crossroad.  However,  Macau,  instead,  became  a  new  minimally  regulated  frontier
through liberalization and deregulation; offering foreign casino operations and murky
capital a home and gateway. Coinciding with a global liquidity glut unleashed by the
world’s leading central banks and the opening up of China, Macau prospered on both
inbound and outbound abnormal capital  flows.  As the government seems unable or
unwilling to assert itself or let normal patterns of the economy reassert themselves,
history may repeat itself unless Beijing seeks a decolonizing process that ruptures the
cycles  of  instability.  Just  as  Macau benefited from the instant  returns from opium,
coolie, gold and weapons trade to avoid becoming a failed economy, its current destiny
needs  to  be  crafted  by  actors  who  don’t  sap  it  of  the  vitality,  creativity  and  real
confidence needed to break the spell for a broader emancipation. There is little reason
to believe that the SAR will  reduce its dependence on gambling itself.  With a weak
political society and co-opted civil society, it can be argued that Macau facilitates a
global trade without “producing” anything tangible, and merely serves as a frontier for
further short-term financial speculation in East and Southeast Asia.
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NOTES
1. Macau's junket operators work with the casinos to lure VIP gamblers, organizing transport
and accommodation, as well as offering credit and collecting debts.
2. Special Banknotes are printed by the Macau Monetary Authority (AMCM) but only available to
residents, for investment purposes. 
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ABSTRACTS
The expansion of casino concessions and subsequent growth of employment and gross domestic
product (GDP) per Capita in Macau after the 1999 handover from Portugal created an illusion of
prosperity in a post-colonial territory of less than 30 sq. km. A Special Administrative Region
(SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),  it  is  the only place in China where adults can
legally  gamble  in  casinos.  This  paper,  using  interviews  with  local  residents,  argues  that  the
imagined category of “World Centre of Tourism and Leisure” coined by local authorities’ masks
an illicit occult economy. The paper argues that the miraculous swiftness of GDP per capital,
employment  and  budget  surplus  growth,  was  a  result  of  a  new  post-colonial  elite  looking
backwards into its colonial past. The paper argues that while the “World Centre of Tourism and
Leisure” is a political construct and key hegemonic project to keep citizens in a hyper-real world
of  simulacra  and  control,  it  is  at  the  cost  of  everyday  gossip,  caution,  self-censorship  and
demoralization.
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